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The  strong  inflow  of  capital  in  recent  years  has  increased  the  integration  of  the  Czech 
economy into international financial markets. Non-residents have a significant share in the 
equities of the financial and non-financial sectors thanks to past foreign direct investment. 
Moreover,  they  hold  a  range  of  other  securities  as  portfolio  investment,  for  example 
government and corporate bonds and shares traded on stock exchanges. As a result, prices of 
assets on the domestic financial markets often change in line with global market sentiment. In 
addition, a number of domestic entities take credit abroad, either via issuing international debt 
securities  or  taking  a  loan  from  internationally  active  bank.  Similar  level  of  financial 
integration can be seen in other new EU Member States and EU accession and candidate 
countries.  
The dominance of foreign players on domestic territory may generate concerns about whether 
the domestic financial and real sectors are becoming too dependent on foreign factors. One of 
the traditional problems discussed in analyses of financial stability for strongly financially 
integrated markets is the risk of cross-border contagion. A shock which affects one country 
can generate turbulence on financial markets and spill over to other countries through existing 
links and financial exposures. The issue of cross-border contagion has often been mentioned 
as one of the triggers of the Asian financial crisis in the latter half of the 1990s. The Czech 
Republic experienced this phenomenon during the currency crisis in 1997 (Šmídková 1998). 
In this short article, we focus on the role of foreign banks and foreign lending in the Czech 
Republic and other central and eastern European (CEE) countries and explore the scope for 
cross-border  contagion  via  financial  exposures.  For  the  analysis,  we  use  the  data  on 
international banking business from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), a unique 
data source of cross-border financial linkages.  
The article is organized as follows: section 2 contains a short review of literature related to 
foreign banks, capital flows and cross-border contagion. Section 3 presents main features of 
the database used for the analysis, while section 4 analyses foreign banks’ involvement in the 
Czech Republic and other CEE countries. Section 5 discusses three main factors that can 
increase the risk of cross-border contagion: maturity of cross-border exposures, concentration 
of foreign creditors and the existence of common creditor. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Short review of literature 
At least since the crises in Asia, Russia and Brazil in late 1990s, there has been an increasing 
interest in research of cross-border contagion and spillovers that can spread financial crisis 
from one country to another (Claessen and Forbes 2001). There is no unique definition of   2 
 
contagion: in Eichengreen et al. (1996), contagion is defined as a case where knowing that 
there is a crisis elsewhere increases the probability of crisis at home. Calvo and Reinhart 
(1996) distinguish between fundamentals-based contagion (also called spillover), which arises 
when  the  infected  country  is  linked  to  other  via  trade  or  finance,  and  “pure”  or  “true” 
contagion, which arises when common shocks and all channels for potential interconnection 
are either not present or have been controlled for. The latter kind of contagion is usually 
related to the herding behavior of international investors. 
There are two basic strands of empirical literature exploring the cross-border contagion. Some 
authors look at co-movement of asset prices and test whether a change in asset prices in 
country  A  has some effect on asset prices in country B, using a number of econometric 
techniques (Baig and Goldfajn 1999; Bae et al. 2003; Corsetti et al. 2002; Forbes and Rigobon 
2002). Kumar and Persaud (2002) test for “pure” contagion, looking at changing investors’ 
risk appetite as a trigger for  contagion.  Some literature on contagion looks also on CEE 
countries (Linne 1999; Darvas and Szapary 1999; Gelos and Sahay 2001).   
The other strand of literature looks at existing financial and trade links, exploring the channels 
through which contagion could take place (Dornbush et al. 2000; Kruger 2000). Peek and 
Rosengren  (1997)  investigate  how  financial  crisis  in  Japan  in  early  1990s  had  effect  on 
lending by Japanese banks in the United States. Traditional debate has been also led in the 
realm whether trade or financial linkages are the main transmission channel for contagion 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000; Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001), concluding that financial 
linkages may be more important, mainly due to common bank lender effect. Some recent 
literature  thus  concentrates  on  the  role  of  banking  system  and  international  banks  in 
transmitting financial shocks across borders (Sbracia and Zaghini 2003), including the case of 
CEE countries (Weller and Morzuch 2000). Some literature in this strand uses the same data 
source  as  this  article,  namely  the  BIS  statistics  on  international  banking  business  (Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder 2001), other use for example the data from Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey by IMF (De Alessi Gracio et al. 2005).  
Next  to  empirical  literature,  there  have  also  been  studies  providing  some  theoretical 
framework for possible contagion effects. Pericolli and Sbracia (2003) design a two-country 
model of portfolio allocation and asset pricing that provides a highly stylized account of how 
a crisis originating in one country can spread to the world economy. Other theoretical models 
can be found in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) or Corsetti (2000).  
This article discusses also the role of foreign banks and foreign lending in CEE countries as a 
possible transmitter of shocks across borders. More in general, the role of foreign banks in 
CEE countries and emerging countries has been analyzed over the past years, including the 
positive effects and possible financial stability implications (Haas and Lelyveld 2003; Haas 
and Lelyveld 2002; Haas and Naaborg 2005; Weill 2003; Clarke et al. 2001a, 2001b; Clarke 
et al. 2002).  
 
3. Data description 
The analysis is based on the consolidated international banking statistics collected by the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The data cover financial claims reported to BIS by 
domestic bank head offices in 27 major banking centers, including the exposures of their 
foreign  affiliates,  and  are  collected  on  a  worldwide  consolidated  basis  with  inter-office 
positions being netted out.
1 The claims include deposits with and loans and advances to banks 
                                                
1 In addition to consolidated banking statistics, the BIS collects also data on locational banking statistics where 
inter-office positions are not netted out, see BIS (2003).    3 
 
and non-banks, holdings of securities and participations. The main purpose of the statistics is 
to provide comprehensive data on banks’ claims on other countries (BIS 2003). 
The  BIS  consolidated  statistics  distinguishes  between  the  residency  of  the  immediate 
borrower and the residency of the ultimate obligor (McGuire and Wooldridge 2005). The 
ultimate  obligor  refers  to  a  counterparty  that  is  ultimately  responsible  for  servicing  the 
obligation in the event of default by the immediate borrower. As a result, there are two bases 
on which claims of reporting banks on other countries (so-called foreign claims) are reported: 
an immediate borrower basis and an ultimate risk basis.  
Foreign  claims  on  an  immediate  borrower  basis consist of  international claims and  local 
claims of foreign affiliates. International claims include BIS reporting banks’ cross-border 
claims in all currencies plus the local claims of their foreign affiliates in foreign (non-local) 
currencies. Local claims include local claims of foreign banks affiliates in local currency only. 
As a result, local claims on an immediate borrower basis understate the local activity of 
foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries.  
Foreign claims on an ultimate risk basis are broken down to cross-border claims and local 
claims. In this case, however, cross-border claims refer only to “real” cross-border claims, 
while  local claims  include all local activity of foreign banks affiliates, both in local and 
foreign currencies. 
As the breakdown of foreign claims by country, maturity etc. differs between the data on both 
bases, in this article we use mainly the data on an immediate borrower basis, referring to the 
statistics on ultimate risk basis only in few cases.  
4. Analysis of foreign banks’ involvement 
Foreign banks play a key role in providing finance to CEE countries. As Chart 1 indicates, the 
foreign banks’ involvement, as measured by the amount of foreign claims per capita held by 
major international banks on these countries, has been rather low during 1990s, but increased 
heavily over the last couple of years.  
 






















CZ CEE-4 average B-3 average AC-3 aveŕage
 
Source: BIS Consolidated International Banking Statistics, immediate borrower basis; Eurostat. 
Note: CEE-4 countries denote Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and; B-3 stands for Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia; AC-
3 refers to Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia 
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The Czech Republic stands out as one of the main debtors to internationally active banks, but 
the Baltic countries did catch up in the recent past (Estonia has the highest foreign claims per 
capita). Foreign claims on the south-eastern countries such as Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia 
picked up from relatively low values later than those on the other CEE countries. 
In principle, there are two basic channels through which internationally active banks can 
provide  credit  to  other  countries:  directly,  i.e.  via  cross-border  (international) lending, or 
indirectly, via entering the domestic market of a host country in the form of a subsidiary or a 
branch and providing credit locally. Table 1 shows the decomposition of foreign claims on 
CEE countries on an immediate borrower basis. As mentioned in section 3, the BIS data on an 
immediate borrower basis allows decomposing the foreign claims into international (cross-
border) claims and local claims by foreign affiliates, with the caveat that local lending in 
foreign currency is classified as international rather than local claim. Thus, the figure for local 
claims clearly underestimates the importance of the local lending channel, while the statistics 
regarding the international claims overestimates the relevance of cross-border credit.  
 
Table 1: Composition of foreign claims on an immediate borrower basis 
(in USD billion) 
  Total foreign claims  International claims  Local claims 
   1996  2005  1996  2005  1996  2005 
Czech Republic  13.6  94.0  9.6  28.6  4.0  65.4 
                
Hungary  12.9  79.6  11.7  53.5  1.2  26.1 
Poland  11.2  123.2  7.6  62.8  3.6  60.5 
Slovakia  2.7  40.0  2.5  13.6  0.3  26.4 
Slovenia  2.0  17.5  2.0  15.0  0.0  2.5 
                
Estonia  0.2  19.1  0.2  15.9  0.0  3.2 
Lithuania  0.2  14.9  0.2  12.5  0.0  2.4 
Latvia  0.1  12.5  0.1  10.9  0.0  1.6 
                
Bulgaria  2.4  12.5  2.4  9.2  0.0  3.3 
Romania  3.1  31.6  3.0  21.8  0.1  9.7 
Croatia  1.5  45.9  1.5  27.8  0.0  18.2 
Source: BIS Consolidated International Banking Statistics, immediate borrower basis. 
 
In contrast to cross-border lending, local currency lending by foreign affiliates was very low 
or non-existent in mid-1990s in the CEE countries. Both components of foreign lending have 
increased markedly between 1996 and 2005, but the pattern slightly differs across countries. 
The Czech Republic has the highest amount of local claims in absolute terms out of the 
analyzed countries. However, this might be due to both high presence of local subsidiaries of 
foreign banks and the fact that most locally provided loans are denominated in domestic 
currency (CNB 2006). This contrasts with the practice in many other CEE countries where 
local lending in foreign currency is much more common (Backe and Zumer 2005; ECB 2006). 
Table 2 shows both types of foreign banks’ involvement in relative terms. The relevance of 
foreign lending, as measured by the ratio of foreign claims to GDP, is very high in Estonia 
and Croatia, followed by Slovakia, Latvia and the Czech Republic. The share of local claims 
in total foreign claims has risen substantially between 1996 and 2005 in all countries. The 
increase is the combined result of bank acquisitions, usually via privatization, green-field 
investments  of  foreign  banks  and  the  high  credit  growth  the  CEE  countries  have  been 
experiencing over the last couple of years (Backe and Zumer 2005; Backe et al. 2006; ECB 
2006).  Obviously,  given  the  definition  of  local  claims  in  the  BIS  data  on  an  immediate   5 
 
borrower basis, the share of local lending in all foreign claims is underestimated given the 
high share of foreign-currency loans in many CEE countries.  
 
Table 2: Foreign claims on an immediate borrower basis in relative terms 
  
Total foreign 
claims in % of 
GDP 
Local claims by 
foreign banks in % of 
total foreign claims 
Total foreign claims in 
% of total domestic 
credit 
Local claims in % 
of total domestic 
credit 
   1996  2005  1996  2005  1996  2005  1996  2005 
Czech Republic  22.2  75.8  29.1  69.6  32.8  178.1  9.5  123.9 
                    
Hungary  28.6  72.8  9.3  32.8  42.6  124.0  3.9  40.6 
Poland  7.3  40.8  32.5  49.1  25.1  125.7  8.1  61.7 
Slovakia  13.1  84.2  9.9  66.0  25.0  178.7  2.5  117.9 
Slovenia  9.6  51.0  0.0  14.1  30.1  82.6  0.0  11.7 
                    
Estonia  3.9  138.9  0.0  16.7  19.1  214.6  0.0  35.8 
Lithuania  3.0  58.1  0.0  16.0  25.9  144.3  0.0  23.0 
Latvia  1.7  79.2  0.0  12.9  14.9  114.1  0.0  14.7 
                    
Bulgaria  24.8  46.8  0.6  26.5  62.2  113.4  0.4  30.1 
Romania  8.8  32.5  2.4  30.9  39.3  179.8  0.9  55.5 
Croatia  7.6  119.3  0.0  39.6  17.4  170.1  0.0  67.3 
Source: BIS Consolidated International Banking Statistics, immediate borrower basis; IMF IFS. 
 
Table 2 also indicates the relative importance of foreign credit in comparison with domestic 
credit. The combined local currency lending by foreign affiliates and international claims 
exceeded the total domestic credit (ratio higher than 100%) in all countries except Slovenia in 
2005. In some countries, the ratio of foreign claims to domestic credit approaches (or even 
exceeds) 200%. Finally, local claims of foreign banks’ subsidiaries and branches in local 
currency represent quite a large part of domestic credit. Especially two countries, where local 
loans are usually denominated in local currency, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, exhibit 
high share.
2  
The data on an ultimate risk basis better capture the structure of foreign claims, as here the 
local claims include all locally provided finance regardless of the currency of denomination. 
However, these data are available for CEE countries only since 2004, so the comparison over 
a longer period of time cannot be made. In addition, the total foreign claims on an ultimate 
risk basis differ from the total foreign claims on an immediate borrower basis, depending on 
whether  the  risk  have  been  transferred  elsewhere  via  credit  risk  transfer  instruments  or 
guarantees. Table 3 shows both the structure of foreign claims and their relevance in relative 




Table 3: Foreign claims on an ultimate risk basis 



















% of total 
Local 
claims in 
% of total 
domestic                                                  
2 In principle, the ratio of local currency loans to domestic credit should be always lower than 100%. The figures 
for  the  Czech  Republic  and  Slovakia,  exceeding  this  limit,  might  be  caused  by  different  methodology  of 
domestic credit data in the IMF statistics and foreign claims data in the BIS statistics.    6 
 
% of GDP  banks in 
% of total 
foreign 
claims 





Czech Republic  85.1  26.9  58.2  68.7  68.3  161.2  110.2 
                  
Hungary  72.5  36.1  36.4  66.4  50.3  113.0  56.8 
Poland  103.6  32.5  71.1  34.3  68.6  105.7  72.5 
Slovakia  33.9  7.8  26.1  71.5  77.0  151.8  116.9 
Slovenia  14.9  12.1  2.8  43.4  18.8  70.4  13.3 
                  
Estonia  17.5  11.7  5.8  127.5  33.2  197.0  65.3 
Lithuania  11.9  9.5  2.4  46.5  20.2  115.6  23.3 
Latvia  10.8  5.8  5.0  68.1  46.2  98.2  45.3 
                  
Bulgaria  9.4  3.5  6.0  35.4  63.4  85.7  54.3 
Romania  25.8  11.8  14.0  26.6  54.4  146.9  80.0 
Croatia  38.0  16.7  21.3  98.7  55.9  140.6  78.7 
Source: BIS Consolidated International Banking Statistics, ultimate risk basis. 
 
Table  3  shows  that  total  foreign  claims  on  an  ultimate  risk  basis  are  lower  than  on  an 
immediate borrower basis. This would suggest that the risk of default of the debtor in the CEE 
countries  is  transferred  via  credit  derivatives  or  guarantees  to  entities  outside  the  CEE 
countries. For example,  if a  UK  bank provides  a loan to a subsidiary of a German auto 
manufacturer in the Czech Republic and the loan in guaranteed by the parent company in 
Germany,  then  on  an  immediate  risk  basis  the  loan  would  be  reported  as  a  claim  on  a 
borrower in the Czech Republic, but on an ultimate risk basis the loan would be reported as a 
claim on a borrower in Germany. Given the relatively high share of foreign ownership of 
corporate  sector  in  CEE  countries,  the  guarantee  channel  might  be  one  of  the  main risk 
transfers channels in these countries. 
The table also shows the relevance of local claims, now including both domestic and foreign 
currency credit. While in CEE-5 countries (except Slovenia) and AC-3 countries local claims 
of foreign affiliates make up the larger part of total foreign loans, in Baltic countries the cross-
border claims represent the main part of foreign claims. 
The increase in foreign claims in CEE countries has been mainly due to the entry of foreign 
banks  into  the  domestic  markets.  Table  4  shows  that  while  number  of  all  banks  rather 
declined over the last six years in the CEE countries, the number of foreign-owned banks 
increased. This reflects the on-going new entries of foreign entities into domestic banking 
sector and its subsequent consolidation.   
While in the first half of 1990s foreign banks usually entered the central and eastern European 
banking markets via green-field investment, establishing a branch or subsidiary, towards the 
end  of  1990s  and  especially  over  the  last  five  years  the  most  usual  way  of  entry  was 
acquisition of a local bank through privatization. Moreover, some of the green-field-based 
subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks later participated in state bank privatizations. As a 
result, the share  of  foreign  ownership of banks increased considerably in CEE countries, 
reaching values around 80%-90% with the exception of Slovenia and partly Latvia.
3  
                                                
3 The lower share of foreign-owned banks in Romania as of 2005 does not yet reflect the early 2006 privatization 
of the biggest Romanian bank Banca Comerciala Romana to the Austrian Erste Bank that will increase the share 
of foreign-owned banks to around 80%.    7 
 
Table 4 also illustrates that the increase in foreign ownership over the last five years was 
indeed due to privatization, as it corresponds with the decrease in the share of state-owned 
banks. 
Table 4: Foreign ownership of banks 
 
  
No of banks  
(of which foreign-
owned) 
Asset share of 
foreign-owned 
banks (in %) 
Asset share of 
state-owned 
banks (in %) 
Non-performing 
loans (in % of total 
loans) 
   1999  2005  1999  2005  1999  2005  1999  2005 
Czech 
Republic  42 (27)  36 (27)  38.4  84.4  41.2  2.5  43.4  4 
                     
Hungary  43 (29)  38 (27)  61.5  82.6  7.8  7  4.4  3.1 
Poland  77 (39)  61 (50)  49.3  74.2  24.9  21.5  14.9  12.9 
Slovakia  23 (10)  21 (16)  24.1  97.3  50.7  1.1  32.9  5.5 
Slovenia  31 (5)  25 (9)  4.9  22.6  42.2  12  9.3  6.4 
                     
Estonia  7 (3)  13 (10)  89.8  99.4  7.9  0  2.9  0.2 
Lithuania  13 (4)  12 (6)  37.1  91.7  41.9  0  11.9  0.7 
Latvia  23 (12)  23 (10)  74  57.9  2.6  4.3  6.8  0.7 
                     
Bulgaria  34 (22)  34 (23)  42.8  74.5  50.5  1.7  17.5  3.8 
Romania  34 (19)  33 (24)  43.6  59.2  50.3  6.5  35.4  6.1 
Croatia  53 (13)  34 (13)  40.3  91.2  39.8  3.4  20.6  7.2 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2006. 
 
Both  academic  literature  and  practical  experience  have  shown  that  foreign  banks’ 
involvement  in  transition  countries,  especially  via  entering  local  market,  has  brought 
significant benefits in terms of increased competition in the banking sector, better access of 
corporations  and  households  to  external  finance,  risk  management,  efficiency,  corporate 
governance, and overall stability of the sector (Clarke et al. 2001a; Haas and Lelyveld 2002; 
Weill 2003). Banks with international owner may supply credit to the economy in a more 
stable way given the typically high capitalization of foreign banks and access to liquidity from 
the parent office.  
The increase of foreign ownership of banks was also associated with a decrease in the share of 
non-performing loans in banks’ portfolios (see Table 4). However, the causality link is not 
clear and the apparent co-movement is probably a joint product of three factors: first, the 
crisis that most analyzed countries underwent in late 1990s brought the increase in share of 
non-performing loans, and at the same time might have triggered the decision of policymakers 
to  privatize  domestic  banks  to  strong  foreign  owners.  Second,  in  order to attract foreign 
capital, government usually cleaned up the balance sheets of the state-owned banks before 
their  privatization,  moving  the  bad  loans  out  of  the  banking  sector.  Finally,  better  risk 
management und prudent behavior of foreign-owned banks may have prevented accumulation 
of non-performing loans to which state-owned banks might be more prone, especially in an 
environment of strengthened banking supervision. 
 
 
5. Financial stability challenges 
Next to the above mentioned benefits, there are also several less clear-cut financial stability 
implications of foreign bank penetration in CEE countries. The repatriation of local banks’ 
profit to the countries of owners may put pressure on current account. Foreign-owned banks   8 
 
may prefer to provide local loans in foreign currency, especially in the currency of the home 
country if they refinance themselves in the home market via the parent bank. This could 
increase the vulnerability of borrowers to exchange rate movements and transmit back to 
banks via increased credit risk. Additional sources of risk may stem from the transfer of 
decision making and  risk management  to the foreign headquarters and unifying the rules 
within the whole banking group, which does not take into account the local interest and may 
lead to worse access to finance from local small and medium enterprises (Clarke et al. 2001b; 
ECB 2006). 
However,  one  of  the  main  financial  stability  implications  of  foreign  bank  presence  and 
foreign lending is the risk of cross-border contagion. Using the BIS data on international bank 
lending, we discuss more in detail three aspects of cross-border contagion: maturity of cross-
border exposures, concentration of foreign creditors and the existence of common creditor. 
The risk of cross-border contagion increases in particular if the cross-border exposures of 
global  agents  have  very  short  maturity  and  investors  can  thus  liquidate  them  virtually 
instantly. Table 5 shows the maturity breakdown of international claims on CEE countries. 
The Czech Republic, together with Romania, Slovakia and Croatia, has relatively large share 
of  short-term  international  claims  from  foreign  banks,  when  compared  to  other  CEE 
countries.  Nevertheless,  the  share  of  long-term  claims  is  higher.  As  regards  the  claims 
unallocated  by  maturity,  i.e.  mainly  holdings  of  equities,  the  Czech  Republic  stands 
somewhere in the middle of CEE countries. To the extent that holdings of shares represent 
portfolio investments rather than strategic or foreign direct investments, the risk of sudden 
outflow of capital might be higher. 
 
Table 5: International claims by maturity 
(in % of all international claims; end-2005) 
  
Up to and 
incl. 1Y 
Over 1Y and 





Czech Republic  37.7  3.8  41.6  16.9 
          
Hungary  27.1  4.4  48.6  19.9 
Poland  25.5  3.9  52.8  17.9 
Slovakia  41.4  4.2  33.7  20.7 
Slovenia  33.7  4.8  54.2  7.3 
          
Estonia  29.5  7.6  44.2  18.7 
Lithuania  30.0  15.1  44.2  10.7 
Latvia  36.1  11.6  45.9  6.4 
          
Bulgaria  36.8  6.3  49.0  7.9 
Romania  47.4  5.1  41.2  6.4 
Croatia  38.5  7.1  46.9  7.5 
Source: BIS Consolidated International Banking Statistics, immediate borrower basis. 
 
The second factor affecting the risk of cross-border contagion is concentration of foreign 
claims.  For  example,  if  foreign  claims  are  concentrated  with  one  large  creditor  and  that 
creditor is hit by a shock which forces it to liquidate its foreign investments, the impact on the 
debtor country will be certainly greater than if the domestic economy uses foreign capital 
from several countries. Table 6 shows foreign claims by country of origin. Interestingly, the 
main creditors differ across different groups of countries. In CEE-5, Austria and Germany are   9 
 
the most important claim holders, while in Baltic countries it is Sweden and Finland. In AC-3 
countries, next to Austria, Greece is also worth mentioning.
4  
The  table shows that  foreign  claims are relatively  concentrated in  the  case of the Czech 
Republic (the three most important creditor countries hold around 73% of all foreign reported 
claims) compared to other CEE countries. However, the by far most concentrated foreign 
claims can be found in Baltic countries. In Estonia, for example, the foreign claims coming 
from Sweden account for almost 80% of all foreign claims, suggesting that the sensitivity of 
Estonian financial sector to economic conditions in Sweden might be relatively high. 
 
Table 6: Foreign bank claims by geographic origin 
(end-2005; claims by banks from selected countries in % of total foreign claims) 
   AT  BE  DE  FI  FR  GR  JP  NL  SE  US  Top-3 
Czech 
Republic  28.4  26.2  6.7  0.0  18.6  0.0  0.5  3.4  0.0  2.7  73.2 
                         
Hungary  23.9  12.8  25.6  0.0  4.1  0.0  1.4  4.7  0.2  2.6  62.3 
Poland  7.4  6.7  16.7  0.1  2.9  0.0  2.5  10.6  1.9  5.9  34.8 
Slovakia  42.0  9.3  4.9  0.0  2.2  0.0  0.2  8.2  0.1  3.1  59.5 
Slovenia  39.8  7.2  21.3  0.0  8.9  0.1  1.7  1.1  0.1  0.2  70.0 
                         
Estonia  1.5  0.6  5.3  12.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  78.2  0.2  95.5 
Lithuania  2.4  0.4  9.5  14.2  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  56.7  0.4  80.4 
Latvia  2.6  0.2  10.3  10.4  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  58.2  0.1  78.9 
                         
Bulgaria  16.0  0.8  7.3  0.0  4.4  18.7  0.4  2.1  0.0  2.5  42.1 
Romania  19.6  0.2  5.5  0.0  16.4  11.5  0.5  12.0  0.2  3.5  48.1 
Croatia  41.7  0.4  7.3  0.0  1.2  0.3  0.9  0.4  0.0  0.5  50.2 
Source: BIS Consolidated International Banking Statistics, immediate borrower basis. 
 
The  third  factor  which  co-determines  the  degree  of  risk  of cross-border contagion is the 
degree of similarity of the creditor structures of individual debtor countries. For example, if a 
debtor country was hit by a large shock and all the creditors of that country were affected, it is 
possible that they would also withdraw their exposures from other countries where they have 
their claims (Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000; Peek and Rosengren 2000; Sbarcia and Zaghini 
2001). If the creditor structure of another country was completely identical to that of the 
country affected by the primary shock, this other country would also probably be hit by an 
investment outflow to the same extent. 
To  capture  the  degree  of  similarity  of  creditor  structure,  we  calculated  common  creditor 
indices  (Van  Rijckeghem  and  Weder  2001;  De  Alessi  Gracio  et  al.  2005).  The  index  I 
measures the similarity in patterns of creditors between any two countries and is bounded 
between 0 and 1 (1 indicates the same composition of creditors, while 0 indicates no common 
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4 Unfortunately, the BIS data on an immediate borrower basis do not include claims by Italian banks, which are 
very active in the region.   10 
 
where vxc denotes the common creditor country’s foreign claims on the CEE country x, vyc 
denotes the common creditor country’s foreign claims on the CEE country y, vx denotes total 
foreign claims on the CEE country x, and vy denotes total foreign claims on the CEE country 
y. Intuitively, index I is made up of two terms. The first term equals the common creditor’s 
share of total foreign claims on the two CEE countries. The second term weights the first term 
- a higher weight reflects greater similarity between the shares of total foreign claims held by 
the common creditor. Summing is done across the 10 common creditor countries given in 
Table 6.  
 
Table 7: Common Creditor Indices 
(end-2005; using country structure of foreign claims on an immediate borrower basis) 
CZ  1.00                     
HU  0.67  1.00                   
PL  0.44  0.67  1.00                 
SK  0.62  0.70  0.64  1.00               
SI  0.64  0.78  0.56  0.76  1.00             
EE  0.12  0.14  0.15  0.10  0.10  1.00           
LT  0.24  0.36  0.39  0.27  0.29  0.79  1.00         
LV  0.23  0.38  0.40  0.28  0.32  0.79  0.95  1.00       
BG  0.48  0.60  0.62  0.62  0.51  0.09  0.26  0.28  1.00     
RO  0.61  0.61  0.56  0.62  0.54  0.10  0.26  0.28  0.71  1.00   
HR  0.47  0.56  0.55  0.80  0.71  0.11  0.31  0.33  0.67  0.53  1.00 
  CZ  HU  PL  SK  SI  EE  LT  LV  BG  RO  HR 
Source: BIS Consolidated International Banking Statistics, immediate borrower basis. 
 
Table 7 indicates that some CEE countries indeed share to some extent common creditors 
with each other. The Czech Republic's creditor structure is broadly similar to that of Slovenia, 
Slovakia,  Hungary,  and  also  Romania,  but  less  similar  to  that  of  Poland  and  other  CEE 
countries. This reflects the results of the expansion strategy of several (mainly EU-based) 
banking groups which acquired significant shares in domestic banking sectors in a number of 
central and eastern European countries. Interestingly, two main groups of countries linked 
with common creditors are emerging: CEE-5 and AC-3 countries on the one hand, and Baltic 
countries on the other hand. As discussed above, this is due to significant role of foreign 
banks from Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Belgium in the CEE-5 and AC-3 countries as 
compared to the role of Scandinavian banks in Baltic countries.   
However,  the  picture  may  be  distorted  by  the  inclusion  of  the  claims  of  subsidiaries  of 
reporting banks, including loans with longer maturities, which probably could not be instantly 
liquidated in the event of cross-border contagion. Moreover, the common creditor effect to 
materialize and to present a risk to financial stability would require two additional conditions 
to be fulfilled: first, the common creditor bank would have to be rather weak, and second, the 
adverse shock would have to be rather large. These conditions are rather hard to be fulfilled. 
Foreign  banks  active  in  the  CEE  countries  are  usually  ones  of  the  largest  banks  from 
advanced EU countries and the relevance of CEE claims in their portfolios is rather limited.
5 
The vulnerability of the financial sector in many CEE countries is also limited by sufficiently 
sound macroeconomic policies. Thus, so far the risk of cross-border contagion seems to be 
contained.  
 
                                                
5 However, there is some opposite evidence for Austrian banks where claims on CEE countries represent a 
relatively large share of both total assets and income (Breyer 2004).   11 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this article, the role of foreign banks and foreign lending in the Czech Republic and other 
CEE countries was analyzed from the financial stability perspective. Increased integration of 
CEE countries into international financial markets, both via borrowing abroad and entry of 
foreign banks into local markets, might increase the risk of cross-border contagion.  
Using the BIS data on international banking business, we analyzed the pattern of foreign 
bank’s  involvement  and  concentrated  on  three  aspects  related  to  the  risk  of  cross-border 
contagion:  maturity  of  cross-border  exposures,  concentration  of  foreign  creditors  and  the 
existence of common creditor. The analysis suggests that the integration of CEE countries 
into international financial markets and the high share of foreign ownership and capital flows 
into these countries may create channels for the transmission of foreign shocks and foster 
greater susceptibility to the risk of cross-border contagion. The analysis concentrated on the 
“fundamental-based”  contagion,  i.e.  caused  by  the  existence  of  financial  cross-border 
linkages, but in principle high openness of financial sectors in the CEE countries may create 
preconditions for any kind of contagion. 
Nevertheless,  any  contagion  through  the  cross-border  claims  channel  would  have  to  be 
generated by a large shock in the source country with a major impact on creditor countries. 
Given the heavy involvement of advanced economies as creditors of CEE countries and the 
relatively small share of claims on CEE countries in the creditors' total portfolios, the risk of 
cross-border contagion can be assessed as relatively limited.  
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